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principle emerges from the instant case: if a lease contains a

pooling clause permitting declarations of units for conservation
purposes, an intent of the parties to freeze their interests will
not be presumed or implied, but must be expressed. Thus, the
draftsman of the lease must manifest such intent clearly and
44
unambiguously.

S. Patrick Phillips

SECURITY DEVICES -

R.S. 9:4812-

REQUIREMENT

OF SUIT

WITHIN ONE YEAR ON MATERIALMAN'S LIEN

Plaintiff materialman furnished certain building materials

to contractor who had entered into an unrecorded written agreement with landowner to construct a building. As provided by
R.S. 9:4812,1 plaintiff recorded his claim for the uncollected balwould be evidenced by the one instrument creating the unit. However, a problem
may arise when pooling clauses in leases on different tracts consolidated into a
declared unit evidence an opposite intention on the question whether a conservation unit would terminate the declared unit. It would appear that the lessor who
intended the termination would not be bound by the declared unit after the creation of the conservation unit. If the unit be terminated as to that lessor, it may
be terminated as to all lessors within the unit. Viator v. Haynesville Mercantile
Co., 230 La. 132, 88 So.2d 1 (1956) ; Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet,
229 La. 306, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956)
(unit invalid from its inception as to one
lessor is invalid from its inception as to all lessors of acreage purported to be
included within the unit).
44. See, e.g., the following provision in a standard lease form: "Any unit created by Lessee hereunder shall also be revised so as to conform with an order of
a Regulatory Body issued after said unit was originally established; such revision
shall be effective as of the effective date of such order without further declaration by lessee." Bath-O-Gram, Form 42 CPM-New South Louisiana Revised Six
(6)-Pooling.
1. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (1950) : "When the owner, or his authorized agent, undertakes the work of construction, improvement, repair, erection, or reconstruction,
for the account of the owner, for which no contract has been entered into, or
when a contract has 'been entered into but has not been recorded, as and when
required, then any person furnishing service of material or performing any labor
on the said building or other work may record in the office of the clerk of court
or recorder of mortgages in the parish in which the said work is being done or
has been done, a copy of his estimate or an affidavit of his claim or any other
writing evidencing same, which recordation, if done within sixty days after the
date of the last delivery of all material upon the said property or the last performance of all services or labor upon the same, by the said furnisher of material
or the said laborer, shall create a privilege upon the building or other structure
and upon the land upon which it is situated, in favor of any such person who
shall have performed service or labor or delivered material in connection with the
said work or improvement, as his interest may appear. The said privilege, recorded as aforesaid, shall constitute a privilege against the property for a period
of one year from the date of its filing, and may be enforced by a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction in the parish in which the land is situated
and such right of action shall prescribe within one year from the date of the
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ance within sixty days from date of last delivery of materials.
There was no judicial action the first year following inscription,
but in the second year, following a timely reinscription of the
claim, suit was brought to enforce the double remedy of R.S.
9:4812 - a privilege against the property and personal action
against the landowner. The trial court rendered judgment
against the owner in personam and against the property in rem.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, one judge dissenting,
amended the judgment to eliminate the personal judgment which
had been abandoned on appeal, and affirmed. 2 On certiorari on
the in rem action alone, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,
two Justices dissenting. Held, provision for reinscription in
materialman's lien statute does not permit the lien to be enforced against the property by civil action filed more than one
year after original recordation. Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Crochet,
244 La. 1060, 156 So. 2d 438 (1963).
Under R.S. 9:4801-4817, suppliers of materials for construction on immovable property, among others, have been granted
certain rights against the improvement and the land upon which
it is situated as well as against the owner of the property. 3 The
provisions governing the materialman's privilege can be divided
initially into two parts: those which refer to written contracts
which are recorded (R.S. 9:4801-4802) ; and those which refer
to written contracts not recorded and oral contracts (R.S.
9:4812) .4 Since these sections cover different situations, R.S.
recordation of the privilege in the office of the recorder of mortgages. The effect
of registry ceases, even against the owner of the property or the property itself,
if the inscription has not been renewed within one year from the date of the
recordation. Any person furnishing service or material or performing any labor
on the said building or other work to or for a contractor or sub-contractor, when
a contract, oral or written, has been entered into, but no contract has been
timely recorded, shall have a personal right of action against the owner for the
amount of his claim for a period of one year from the filing of his claim, which
right of action shall not prescribe within one year of the date of its recordation,
or the reinscription thereof. This shall not interfere with the personal liability
of the owner for material sold to or services or labor performed for him or his
authorized agent. The said privilege shall be superior to all other claims against
the land and improvements except taxes, local assessments for public improvements, a bona fide mortgage, or a bona fide vendor's privilege, whether arising
from a sale or arising from a sale and resale to and from a regularly organized
homestead or building and loan association, if the vendor's privilege or mortgage
exists and has been duly recorded before the work or labor is begun or any material is furnished. The wages of a laborer for work done by him on any building,
shall, when properly presented and recorded by him in accordance with the provisions of this Sub-part, create in his favor a privilege on the land and improvements which will prime the right of mortgagees or vendors."
2. Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Crochet, 146 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
3. LA. R.S. 9:48014817 (1950).
4. See note 1 supra.
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NOTES

9:4812 should be construed independently of the other sections. 5
In general, R.S. 9:4812 provides for a privilege on the building
and the land and a personal right of action against the owner
independent of the privilege.6 With respect to the privilege and
the right to enforce it, the statute originally provided that recordation constituted a privilege against the property "for a
period of one year from the date of its filing, unless interrupted
by judicial proceeding . . ." Therefore, it was necessary to
institute suit within one year to enforce the privilege, but after
suit there was no need to reinscribe the claim. 8 In 1938, the
statute was amended 9 to provide, inter alia:
"The said privilege, recorded as aforesaid, shall constitute a
privilege against the property for a period of one year from
the date of its filing, and may be enforced by a civil action
.. and such right of action shall prescribe within one year
from the date of the recordation of the privilege in the office
of the recorder of mortgages. The effect of the registry
ceases, even against the owner of the property or the property itself, if the inscription has not been renewed within one
year from the date of the recordation .. .-.
Since this amendment to the statute, the court has required reinscription of the privilege even though suit has been filed within one year of the original recordation." On the other hand,
similar language in R.S. 9:4812 which provides for the personal
action against the owner 12 was interpreted not to require rein3
scription once the action had been filed within the first year.'
5. DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES 298 (1942).
See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term - Security Devices, 7 LA. L. REV. 234 (1947).
6. See note 1 supra.
7. La. Acts 1926, No. 298, § 12.
8. Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Crochet, 244 La. 1060, 156 So. 2d 438 (1963) ; National Homestead Ass'n v. Graham, 176 La. 1062, 147 So. 348 (1933) ; Moseley
v. Levy, 18 La. App. 70, 137 So. 559 (2d Cir. 1931).
9. La. Acts 1938, No. 323, § 1.
10. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (1950). See note 1 supra.
11. Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 197 So. 566
(1940).
12. The statute provides: "Any person furnishing service or material . . .
shall have a personal right of action against the owner for the amount of his
claim for a period of one year from the filing of his claim, which right of action
shall not prescribe within one year of the date of its recordation, or the reinscription thereof."
13. Rathborne Lumber & Supply Co. v. Falgout, 222 La. 345, 62 So. 2d 507
(1952). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term
- Civil Procedure, 12 LA. L. REv. 184 (1952) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term -Security
Devices, 14 LA. L. REV. 150
(1953) ; Comment, 12 LA. L. REv. 210, 214 (1952). It should be pointed out
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This distinction can be justified from a policy standpoint since
the privilege is a right in rem against the property and poses a
danger to third persons which should appear on the records,
while the personal action poses no special danger to the property. Prior to the instant case, the question whether reinscription extended beyond the first year the time in which suit might
be filed to enforce the privilege had not been presented. It had
been suggested by one writer that in view of the singular term
"reinscription," the privilege at least could not be extended beyond a second year. 14 With respect to the personal action, one
court of appeal has held that "reinscription" in the singular in
that part of R.S. 9:4812 required the personal action to be
brought no later than during the first reinscription."
In the instant case, the Supreme Court was concerned with
the question whether the privilege could be enforced more than
one year after the original inscription, but within one year of
its reinscription.'5 It concluded that reinscription preserved the
privilege but not the right to enforce it, and therefore the right
to enforce the privilege was lost unless judicially asserted within
one year of the original recordation.17 The court first recognized
that the materialman's privilege was in derogation of the common rights of the owner and his ordinary creditors and hence
must be strictly construed."' It then noted that the language
creating the privilege in fact created two rights - the privilege
itself and the right to enforce it - and that reinscription preserved only "the effect of registry." 19 The court reasoned that
the only effect of registry is to create the privilege, and that
the language establishing the prescription on the right to enforce the privilege was independent of the language creating
that the same rationale would not apply to the in rem action since it appears in
a different part of the statute, and under the principle of stricti juris, it would
not be appropriate to attach a retrospective quality to the provisions concerning
the personal right of action.
14. DAGGETT, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES 322 (1942):
"There is some doubt about whether the life of the privilege could be prolonged
indefinitely by reinscription at least once each year. Since the statute does not
so provide in express words, it would follow, under the strict construction rule,
that the life of the privilege could not be continued for a longer period of time
than two years." See Thibodaux Boiler Works v. People's Sugar Co., 122 So.
290 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
15. Kaplan v. Pettigrew, 150 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
16. Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Crochet, 244 La. 1060, 156 So. 2d 438 (1963). See
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1962-1968 Term- Security
Devices, 24 LA. L. REV. 205, 208 (1964).
17. 244 La. at 1072, 156 So. 2d at 443.
18. Id. at 1067, 156 So. 2d at 441.
19. Id. at 1069, 156 So. 2d at 441.
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the privilege and not an effect of registry. 20 Thus the privilege
could be preserved by reinscription, but unless suit had been instituted within one year from original recordation, it "becomes

a hollow right for it can no longer be enforced.

' 21

The court

further reasoned that a contrary interpretation would allow the
claimant to encumber the property perpetually by annual reinscription without ever seeking to obtain judicial recognition of
the privilege.22 The court determined that such interpretation
would not be sound policy and could be avoided by resolving the
onerous implications of the statute's ambiguous language
against the person in whose favor the privilege was created. 2
With regard to the purpose of the 1938 amendment in permit-

ting reinscription, the court observed that reinscription was
now necessary to preserve the privilege even though suit had
been filed.
The decision undoubtedly upholds the policy of strictly con-

struing privileges

;24

and in view of the policy considerations

emphasized by the court and the somewhat ambiguous language

of the statute, the decision cannot be said to be unreasonable.
Even within the confines of strict construction, however, it is
certainly arguable that registry of the claim creates both the

privilege and the right to enforce it - that "the effect of registry" is an inseverable privilege and right of enforcement. The
court's narrow construction rejects what at least one writer con-

sidered to be the effect of the statute's amendment. 25 The Supreme Court itself has made the statement that "the manifest
purpose of the amendment was to substitute a new and different
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1070, 156 So. 2d at 442.
Id. at 1072, 156 So. 2d at 443.
Id. at 1074, 156 So. 2d at 443.
Ibid.

24. 2 PLANIOL, CIviL LAW TREATISE

(AN

ENGLISH

TRANSLATION

BY

THE

LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2544 (1959). See, e.g., Glassell, Taylor
& Robinson v. John W. Harris Associates, 209 La. 957, 26 So. 2d 1 (1946) ; Conservative Homestead Ass'n v. Boyle, 172 La. 878, 135 So. 663 (1931) ; Cole v.
Schexnadire, 163 La. 132, 111 So. 651 (1927) ; Alfred Hiller Co. v. Hotel Grunewald Co., 147 La. 129, 84 So. 520 (1920) ; Kaplan v. Pettigrew, 150 So. 2d 600
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Clarke v. Shaffett, 37 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1948) ; Griffith v. Williams, 19 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944) ; Yellow Pine
Lumber Co. v. Maniscalco, 9 So. 2d 320 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Callendar v.
Marks, 166 So. 891 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936) ; Texas Lumber Co. v. E. D. Green
Realty Co., 19 La. App. 585, 140 So. 828 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Southern Gas Line
v. Dixie Oil Co., 16 La. App. 26, 133 So. 181 (2d Cir. 1931); Fowler Comm'n
Co. v. E. J. Deas & Co., 13 La. App. 141, 127 So. 456 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Lawrence
v. Wright, 11 La. App. 703, 124 So. 697 (Orl. Cir. 1929) ; Price v. Lee, 11 La.
App. 291, 123 So. 458 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Casey v. Ajlain, 9 La. App. 725, 120 So.
420 (Orl. Cir. 1929); Routier v. Hughes, 2 McGloin 99 (La. App. 1884).
25. DAGGEr, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES 322 (1942).
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method of procedure for interrupting or suspending the running

of prescription against the lien." 26 The court's fear that a contrary interpretation would permit perpetual encumbrance could
be avoided by construing the singular term "reinscription" to
allow only one reinscription of the privilege. 27 Since judicial

proceedings do not preserve the privilege, however, such restricted interpretation could create other' serious problems; litigation could easily extend beyond the term of one reinscrip-

tion. 28 In any event, this decision requires the materialman to
file suit on his timely recorded claim within one year of recorda29
tion regardless of reinscription.

Reid K. Hebert

TORTS -

IMPUTATION OF SON'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
TO MOTHER

Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by her minor

son with his father's permission, was injured when her son
negligently attempted a left turn and was struck by defendant
who was negligently attempting to pass him. The district court
rendered judgment for the plaintiff in her suit for personal
injury, but it was reversed in part by the court of appeal. On
certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated the district
court's judgment. Held, in absence of an agency or other legal
relationship for which responsibility is imposed on one for the
fault of another, contributory negligence cannot be imputed to
26. Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La. 814, 825, 197 So.
566, 569 (1940). It should be noted that the use of the terms "interruption" and
"suspension" as effects of the reinscription is not entirely correct, but the scope
of this Note is not intended to include an analytical criticism of such a use.
27. DAGGETT, LoUIsIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES 322 (1942).
28. If only one reinscription were allowed and the court interpreted the stat*ute to permit that reinscription to preserve both the right of action and the privilege, when suit was filed after the first but within the second year, the defendant
owner could effectively use delays which would cause the judicial proceedings to
go beyond the second year-and the plaintiff materialman would lose his privilege. The court effectively avoided this situation by requiring suit to be filed
within the first year and impliedly allowing an unlimited number of reinscriptions in the event judicial proceedings extend beyond the next year.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in the instant case in Arby Brothers, Inc. v. Tillman, 162 So. 2d 346 (La. 1964). Justice Hamiter, who dissented
in the Crochet case, speaking for the majority, said: "The author of this opinion
disagreea with that conclusion [of the Crochet case] and still entertains the same
view. However, since the result reached in such a case does bear on the merchantability of titles to immovables he now feels compelled to abide by the conclusion
'until it is changed by legislative action."

